Every red-flag and yellow-flag finding from the trailing 365 days across every
monitored fund, watchlist and universe, red flags first, then by recency.
Showing 53 of 220
— all severities · Private Credit.
Sterling Entertainment Enterprises LLC newly flagged defaulted in the 2026-03-31 NPORT-P (0.00% of portfolio value, $0); the 2025-12-31 report carried no such flag. (2026-03-31)
Why it matters
The fund's own filing flags a portfolio investment as in default or non-accrual. This is a named credit failure inside the book, and the disclosed size tells you whether it dents NAV or merely trims income.
Source: nport-diff:2026-03-31:flag:sterling entertainment enterprises llc
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-11-06: 11.1% requested, only 63.4% of requests fulfilled. (2025-11-06)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 22% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-10-15).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-10-15: only 21.6% of requests fulfilled. (2025-10-15)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
A dated fee waiver or expense-support arrangement expires within six months.
Why it matters
A dated fee waiver is now within six months of expiry. If it is not extended, the expense increase lands on shareholders; extensions are usually disclosed via a short 8-K or prospectus supplement, so silence approaching the date is itself information.
On July 20, 2026, Jonathan Bock resigned from his role as Blackstone Private Credit Fund’s (the “Fund”) Co -Chief Executive Officer. (2026-07-20)
Why it matters
Key-person changes at externally managed funds are one of the few governance signals these structures emit. A single departure is usually routine; a pattern (or a departure near other stress signals) is not.
On June 15, 2026, Katherine Rubenstein departed her role as Blackstone Private Credit Fund’s (the “Fund”) Chief Operating Officer to pursue other opportunities. (2026-06-15)
Why it matters
Key-person changes at externally managed funds are one of the few governance signals these structures emit. A single departure is usually routine; a pattern (or a departure near other stress signals) is not.
Net outflow of 5.6% of NAV in the period ended 2026-03-31.
Why it matters
Net outflows in a single period reached the scale of a typical quarterly repurchase cap. Demand for the exit is at or beyond what the fund's liquidity program is designed to handle.
Net outflow of 6.0% of NAV in the period ended 2026-03-31.
Why it matters
Net outflows in a single period reached the scale of a typical quarterly repurchase cap. Demand for the exit is at or beyond what the fund's liquidity program is designed to handle.
Net flows deteriorated to $-144.8M from $-49.8M (period ended 2026-03-31).
Why it matters
The fund is shrinking: money going out exceeds money coming in. Persistent negative net flows change the fund's behavior (what it can buy, what it must sell) even before any gate is near.
Net investment income covered only 100% of distributions in the period ended 2026-03-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
Net investment income covered only 89% of distributions in the period ended 2026-03-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
Net investment income covered only 89% of distributions in the period ended 2026-03-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
Net investment income covered only 97% of distributions in the period ended 2026-03-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
Net investment income covered only 97% of distributions in the period ended 2026-03-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
Net investment income covered only 91% of distributions in the period ended 2026-03-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 64% -> 66% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2026-03-31).
Why it matters
The fund leaned meaningfully harder on its leverage in a single period. Even far from the ceiling, the direction and speed of travel matter; creep compounds quietly.
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 59% -> 64% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2026-03-31).
Why it matters
The fund leaned meaningfully harder on its leverage in a single period. Even far from the ceiling, the direction and speed of travel matter; creep compounds quietly.
SILVER POINT LOAN NOTE ISSUER LLC / marked down -28% (2025-12-31 $1,436,727,263 -> 2026-03-31 $1,036,201,909) with par balance unchanged (+-2%) -- a valuation mark, not a trade. (2026-03-31)
Why it matters
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
Source: nport-diff:2026-03-31:mark:silver point loan note issuer llc /
Barracuda Parent, LLC marked down -42% (2025-12-31 $108,936,000 -> 2026-03-31 $63,253,000) with par balance unchanged (+-2%) -- a valuation mark, not a trade. (2026-03-31)
Why it matters
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
Net outflow of 5.1% of NAV in the period ended 2026-02-28.
Why it matters
Net outflows in a single period reached the scale of a typical quarterly repurchase cap. Demand for the exit is at or beyond what the fund's liquidity program is designed to handle.
On February 26, 2026, Dylan Cutinha notified the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Company of his resignation as the Company’s Principal Accounting Officer, effective as of... (2026-02-26)
Why it matters
Key-person changes at externally managed funds are one of the few governance signals these structures emit. A single departure is usually routine; a pattern (or a departure near other stress signals) is not.
Thomas Hansen, who has served as interim Chief Financial Officer of T. (2026-02-24)
Why it matters
Key-person changes at externally managed funds are one of the few governance signals these structures emit. A single departure is usually routine; a pattern (or a departure near other stress signals) is not.
Net outflow of 6.8% of NAV in the period ended 2026-01-31.
Why it matters
Net outflows in a single period reached the scale of a typical quarterly repurchase cap. Demand for the exit is at or beyond what the fund's liquidity program is designed to handle.
Net flows deteriorated to $-49.8M from $-32.6M (period ended 2025-12-31).
Why it matters
The fund is shrinking: money going out exceeds money coming in. Persistent negative net flows change the fund's behavior (what it can buy, what it must sell) even before any gate is near.
Net investment income covered only 97% of distributions in the period ended 2025-12-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
Net investment income covered only 94% of distributions in the period ended 2025-12-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
Net investment income covered only 96% of distributions in the period ended 2025-12-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
Net investment income covered only 90% of distributions in the period ended 2025-12-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
Net investment income covered only 94% of distributions in the period ended 2025-12-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 48% -> 64% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2025-12-31).
Why it matters
The fund leaned meaningfully harder on its leverage in a single period. Even far from the ceiling, the direction and speed of travel matter; creep compounds quietly.
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 55% -> 59% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2025-12-31).
Why it matters
The fund leaned meaningfully harder on its leverage in a single period. Even far from the ceiling, the direction and speed of travel matter; creep compounds quietly.
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 71% -> 79% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2025-12-31).
Why it matters
The fund leaned meaningfully harder on its leverage in a single period. Even far from the ceiling, the direction and speed of travel matter; creep compounds quietly.
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 35% -> 43% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2025-12-31).
Why it matters
The fund leaned meaningfully harder on its leverage in a single period. Even far from the ceiling, the direction and speed of travel matter; creep compounds quietly.
FBLC SENIOR LOAN FUND LLC / marked down -29% (2025-09-30 $81,882,764 -> 2025-12-31 $58,120,503) with par balance unchanged (+-2%) -- a valuation mark, not a trade. (2025-12-31)
Why it matters
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
Source: nport-diff:2025-12-31:mark:fblc senior loan fund llc /
Sedgwick Claims Management Services Inc marked down -97% (2025-09-30 $732,893,000 -> 2025-12-31 $18,951,000) with par balance unchanged (+-2%) -- a valuation mark, not a trade. (2025-12-31)
Why it matters
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
On December 22, 2025, Gauranga Pal notified the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of North Haven Private Income Fund LLC (the “Company”) of his resignation as the Company’s Chief... (2025-12-22)
Why it matters
Key-person changes at externally managed funds are one of the few governance signals these structures emit. A single departure is usually routine; a pattern (or a departure near other stress signals) is not.
Board approved a change to the Fund's fiscal year end from October 31 to December 31, effective for the current fiscal year (a short fiscal period ending December 31, 2025). (2025-12-10)
Why it matters
Governance documents changed. Usually technical; occasionally it moves a shareholder protection, so the specific provision is worth a read.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1688897/000110465925121677/tm2533684d1_8k.htm | verified read during build session
Net outflow of 5.6% of NAV in the period ended 2025-11-30.
Why it matters
Net outflows in a single period reached the scale of a typical quarterly repurchase cap. Demand for the exit is at or beyond what the fund's liquidity program is designed to handle.
On November 5, 2025, the Board of Trustees (“the Board”) of Fidelity Private Credit Fund (the “Fund”) appointed Thomas Flannery to the Board and as a member of the Board’s Audit... (2025-11-05)
Why it matters
Key-person changes at externally managed funds are one of the few governance signals these structures emit. A single departure is usually routine; a pattern (or a departure near other stress signals) is not.
Management Fee Waiver Agreement (in place since the Fund's public offering launch) terminated November 1, 2025; the management fee is now payable at the annual rate of 0.75% of... (2025-11-01)
Why it matters
A fee waiver ended. Net expenses rise immediately and net returns fall by roughly the waived amount; because no dramatic filing accompanies a quiet lapse, this is exactly the kind of change a wholesaler will not volunteer.
Net outflow of 8.1% of NAV in the period ended 2025-10-31.
Why it matters
Net outflows in a single period reached the scale of a typical quarterly repurchase cap. Demand for the exit is at or beyond what the fund's liquidity program is designed to handle.
The Board of Trustees (the “ Board ”) of HPS Corporate Lending Fund (the “ Company ”) appointed Eric Smith as Chief Compliance Officer of the Company, effective as of October 9,... (2025-10-09)
Why it matters
Key-person changes at externally managed funds are one of the few governance signals these structures emit. A single departure is usually routine; a pattern (or a departure near other stress signals) is not.
The Base Management Fee and Subordinated Incentive Fee on Income waiver (last extended through September 30, 2025 per the 2025-03-17 8-K) was not further extended. (2025-09-30)
Why it matters
A fee waiver ended. Net expenses rise immediately and net returns fall by roughly the waived amount; because no dramatic filing accompanies a quiet lapse, this is exactly the kind of change a wholesaler will not volunteer.
Net investment income covered only 92% of distributions in the period ended 2025-09-30; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
Net investment income covered only 82% of distributions in the period ended 2025-09-30; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
Net investment income covered only 89% of distributions in the period ended 2025-09-30; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
Net investment income covered only 91% of distributions in the period ended 2025-09-30; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Why it matters
Distributions exceed net investment income. The gap is funded from capital (the investor's own money back) or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile.
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 69% -> 71% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2025-09-30).
Why it matters
The fund leaned meaningfully harder on its leverage in a single period. Even far from the ceiling, the direction and speed of travel matter; creep compounds quietly.
Net outflow of 5.6% of NAV in the period ended 2025-08-31.
Why it matters
Net outflows in a single period reached the scale of a typical quarterly repurchase cap. Demand for the exit is at or beyond what the fund's liquidity program is designed to handle.
The Adviser's voluntary pre-offering waiver of the Management Fee and Incentive Fee terminated upon commencement of the Fund's public offering of Shares, effective August 29,... (2025-08-29)
Why it matters
A fee waiver ended. Net expenses rise immediately and net returns fall by roughly the waived amount; because no dramatic filing accompanies a quiet lapse, this is exactly the kind of change a wholesaler will not volunteer.