Every red-flag and yellow-flag finding from the trailing 365 days across every
monitored fund, watchlist and universe, red flags first, then by recency.
Showing 24 of 220
— all severities · Private Equity.
Tender offer filled only 54% of shares tendered (pro-rated); redemption requests exceeded the offer size -- the second consecutive oversubscribed offer (expired 2025-12-19).
Why it matters
Two consecutive oversubscribed repurchase offers. Persistent unmet redemption demand is the classic precursor to pro-ration and, in stressed cases, gating.
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-12-19: 9.2% requested, only 54.5% of requests fulfilled. (2025-12-19)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 42% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-09-19).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-09-19: 11.9% requested, only 42.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-09-19)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Proposal 1 put to shareholder vote: Approval Of A New Advisory Agreement. (2026-07-20)
Why it matters
The contract between the fund and its manager changed. Advisory agreements set the economics and the duty of care shareholders actually get; even technical amendments deserve a read for fee or termination-provision drift.
Proposal 2 put to shareholder vote: Approval Of A New Sub-Advisory Agreement. (2026-07-20)
Why it matters
The firm doing the actual investing changed. A subadviser swap can shift strategy, process, and track record even when the headline manager stays the same.
On July 2, 2026, the Company entered into the Seventh Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement (the “Seventh A&R LLCA”), which amended and restated the Company’s... (2026-07-02)
Why it matters
Governance documents changed. Usually technical; occasionally it moves a shareholder protection, so the specific provision is worth a read.
In connection with the foregoing, on July 2, 2026, the Company entered into a Second Amended and Restated Management Agreement (the “Second A&R Management Agreement”) with KKR DAV... (2026-07-02)
Why it matters
The contract between the fund and its manager changed. Advisory agreements set the economics and the duty of care shareholders actually get; even technical amendments deserve a read for fee or termination-provision drift.
On July 2, 2026, the Board of Directors of the Company adopted a revised share repurchase plan (the “Share Repurchase Plan”) to, among other things, incorporate the Class I Series... (2026-07-02)
Why it matters
The rules governing how investors exit changed. For a semi-liquid fund the repurchase program IS the liquidity; any change to caps, frequency, or pricing deserves a direct read.
Net outflow of 5.6% of NAV in the period ended 2026-03-31.
Why it matters
Net outflows in a single period reached the scale of a typical quarterly repurchase cap. Demand for the exit is at or beyond what the fund's liquidity program is designed to handle.
NAV per share ($2.22) is -0.3% below its trailing four-observation average ($2.21) as of 2026-03-31.
Why it matters
NAV has been running at least 2% below its own recent trailing average. Unlike a single sharp markdown, a sustained slide means the pressure on valuations is persistent rather than a one-period event.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1447247/000139834426010605/fp0098460-3_ncsr.htm | per-class statement blocks (V5 family, non-FS filer agent), Class I
Castlelake Consumer Receivables Opportunity III, L.P. (2026-03-31)
Why it matters
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
Source: nport-diff:2026-03-31:mark:castlelake consumer receivables opportunity iii, l.p.
EQT VIII Co-Investment (D) SCSp marked down -100% (2025-12-31 $187,593,706 -> 2026-03-31 $1) with par balance unchanged (+-2%) -- a valuation mark, not a trade. (2026-03-31)
Why it matters
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
Source: nport-diff:2026-03-31:mark:eqt viii co-investment (d) scsp
FSN Capital Unique Co-Investment L.P. (2026-03-31)
Why it matters
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
Source: nport-diff:2026-03-31:mark:fsn capital unique co-investment l.p.
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
Source: nport-diff:2026-03-31:mark:the veritas capital vlll, l.p. /
Pharmathen Topco Sarl marked down -60% (2025-09-30 $154,721,115 -> 2025-12-31 $62,518,847) with par balance unchanged (+-2%) -- a valuation mark, not a trade. (2025-12-31)
Why it matters
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
Chance Co-Investment, L.P marked down -100% (2025-09-30 $13,408,252 -> 2025-12-31 $0) with par balance unchanged (+-2%) -- a valuation mark, not a trade. (2025-12-31)
Why it matters
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
SHOREVIEW CAPITAL PARTNERS III / marked down -41% (2025-09-30 $13,829,268 -> 2025-12-31 $8,153,007) with par balance unchanged (+-2%) -- a valuation mark, not a trade. (2025-12-31)
Why it matters
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
Source: nport-diff:2025-12-31:mark:shoreview capital partners iii /
NAV per share ($2.31) is 38.4% below its trailing four-observation average ($3.75) as of 2025-09-30.
Why it matters
NAV has been running at least 2% below its own recent trailing average. Unlike a single sharp markdown, a sustained slide means the pressure on valuations is persistent rather than a one-period event.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1447247/000139834425022223/fp0096342-3_ncsrs.htm | per-class statement blocks (V5 family, non-FS filer agent), Class I
Trive Capital Fund III LP marked down -81% (2025-06-30 $21,752,108 -> 2025-09-30 $4,171,009) with par balance unchanged (+-2%) -- a valuation mark, not a trade. (2025-09-30)
Why it matters
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
Source: nport-diff:2025-09-30:mark:trive capital fund iii lp
The Resolute Fund IV, LP marked down -36% (2025-06-30 $56,967,102 -> 2025-09-30 $36,474,613) with par balance unchanged (+-2%) -- a valuation mark, not a trade. (2025-09-30)
Why it matters
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
Source: nport-diff:2025-09-30:mark:the resolute fund iv, lp
FB HA HOLDINGS LP PROJECT BRE PARTNERS / marked down -50% (2025-06-30 $9,030,803 -> 2025-09-30 $4,540,120) with par balance unchanged (+-2%) -- a valuation mark, not a trade. (2025-09-30)
Why it matters
A portfolio position was written down materially. Marks are management's own estimate of impairment, so a large markdown is a loss being recognized -- the fund-level NAV effect depends on the position's size.
Source: nport-diff:2025-09-30:mark:fb ha holdings lp project bre partners /