Every red-flag and yellow-flag finding from the trailing 365 days across every monitored fund, watchlist and universe, red flags first, then by recency. Showing 35 of 220 — Red flag.
XCY52B68.UC newly flagged interest payments in arrears in the 2026-05-31 NPORT-P (0.04% of portfolio value, $518,550); the 2026-02-28 report carried no such flag. (2026-05-31)
The fund's own filing flags a portfolio investment as in default or non-accrual. This is a named credit failure inside the book, and the disclosed size tells you whether it dents NAV or merely trims income.
Source: nport-diff:2026-05-31:flag:xcy52b68.uc
NAV per share fell 6.7% from $63.41 to $59.18 (2026-04-30).
A 5%+ single-month NAV decline is a severe markdown for a private-markets vehicle and usually coincides with a portfolio-level credit or valuation problem being recognized.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1581005/000113322826010229/srtll-efp25316_ncsrs.htm | financial-highlights end-of-period NAV (fallback)
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 3% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2026-03-31).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312526216496/ck0001711929-20260331.htm | redemption disclosure (redemption_fill_rate)
The fund is at or near its allowed leverage limit (99% of permitted leverage in use as of 2026-03-31) (GAAP-equity approximation of a cost-basis charter test; the fund's own NASAA calculation may show compliance).
The fund is essentially at or beyond its permitted leverage. This can force asset sales at bad prices or halt distributions/repurchases; for a BDC it is a statutory line, not a preference.
Source: derived: (ceiling 300.0% of net assets - leverage 296.2%, denominator = charter net assets (total assets - total liabilities) 4,064,215,000) / ceiling * 100
NAV per share fell 32.6% from $8.27 to $5.57 (2026-03-31).
A 5%+ single-month NAV decline is a severe markdown for a private-markets vehicle and usually coincides with a portfolio-level credit or valuation problem being recognized.
Source: us-gaap:NetAssetValuePerShare | accession 0001655887-26-000013 | 10-Q filed 2026-05-08
Sterling Entertainment Enterprises LLC newly flagged defaulted in the 2026-03-31 NPORT-P (0.00% of portfolio value, $0); the 2025-12-31 report carried no such flag. (2026-03-31)
The fund's own filing flags a portfolio investment as in default or non-accrual. This is a named credit failure inside the book, and the disclosed size tells you whether it dents NAV or merely trims income.
Source: nport-diff:2026-03-31:flag:sterling entertainment enterprises llc
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-03-31: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. (2026-03-31)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312526216496/ck0001711929-20260331.htm | redemption proration (2026-03-31)
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 3% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2026-02-28).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312526216496/ck0001711929-20260331.htm | redemption disclosure (redemption_fill_rate)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-02-28: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. (2026-02-28)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312526216496/ck0001711929-20260331.htm | redemption proration (2026-02-28)
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 51% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2026-02-27).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1687898/000121390026065340/ea0291351-01_ncsr.htm | redemption disclosure (redemption_fill_rate)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-02-27: only 51.0% of requests fulfilled. (2026-02-27)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1687898/000121390026065340/ea0291351-01_ncsr.htm | redemption proration (2026-02-27)
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 27% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2026-02-03).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1597634/000139834426010317/fp0098622-1_ncsrs.htm | redemption disclosure (redemption_fill_rate)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-02-03: only 27.0% of requests fulfilled. (2026-02-03)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1597634/000139834426010317/fp0098622-1_ncsrs.htm | redemption proration (2026-02-03)
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 3% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2026-01-31).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312526216496/ck0001711929-20260331.htm | redemption disclosure (redemption_fill_rate)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-01-31: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. (2026-01-31)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312526216496/ck0001711929-20260331.htm | redemption proration (2026-01-31)
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 16% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2026-01-30).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1515001/000121390026065345/ea0290589-01_ncsr.htm | Harrison N-CSR results table; accession=0001213900-26-065345; offer_pct=5; offered_shares=3335332; tendered_shares=20284799; implied_outstanding_shares=66706640.000000000000; filed Percentage of Tendered Shares Repurchased = 16%
The fund is at or near its allowed leverage limit (101% of permitted leverage in use as of 2025-12-31) (GAAP-equity approximation of a cost-basis charter test; the fund's own NASAA calculation may show compliance).
The fund is essentially at or beyond its permitted leverage. This can force asset sales at bad prices or halt distributions/repurchases; for a BDC it is a statutory line, not a preference.
Source: derived: (ceiling 300.0% of net assets - leverage 275.2%, denominator = charter net assets (total assets - total liabilities) 4,367,591,000) / ceiling * 100
Tender offer filled only 54% of shares tendered (pro-rated); redemption requests exceeded the offer size -- the second consecutive oversubscribed offer (expired 2025-12-19).
Two consecutive oversubscribed repurchase offers. Persistent unmet redemption demand is the classic precursor to pro-ration and, in stressed cases, gating.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1557265/000121390026025198/ea0273363-01_ncsr.htm | redemption disclosure (redemption_fill_rate)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-12-19: 9.2% requested, only 54.5% of requests fulfilled. (2025-12-19)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1557265/000121390026025198/ea0273363-01_ncsr.htm | redemption proration (2025-12-19)
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 51% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-11-21).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1687898/000121390026065340/ea0291351-01_ncsr.htm | redemption disclosure (redemption_fill_rate)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-11-21: only 51.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-11-21)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1687898/000121390026065340/ea0291351-01_ncsr.htm | redemption proration (2025-11-21)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-11-06: 11.1% requested, only 63.4% of requests fulfilled. (2025-11-06)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1752019/000119312526093570/d105828dncsr.htm | redemption proration (2025-11-06)
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 30% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-11-04).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1597634/000139834426010317/fp0098622-1_ncsrs.htm | redemption disclosure (redemption_fill_rate)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-11-04: only 30.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-11-04)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1597634/000139834426010317/fp0098622-1_ncsrs.htm | redemption proration (2025-11-04)
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 22% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-10-24).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1515001/000121390026065345/ea0290589-01_ncsr.htm | Harrison N-CSR results table; accession=0001213900-26-065345; offer_pct=6; offered_shares=4311315; tendered_shares=19211446; implied_outstanding_shares=71855250.000000000000; filed Percentage of Tendered Shares Repurchased = 22%
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 22% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-10-15).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1818416/000110465926024608/tm262309d1_ncsr.htm | redemption disclosure (redemption_fill_rate)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-10-15: only 21.6% of requests fulfilled. (2025-10-15)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1818416/000110465926024608/tm262309d1_ncsr.htm | redemption proration (2025-10-15)
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 4% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-09-30).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312525277275/ck0001711929-20250930.htm | redemption disclosure (redemption_fill_rate)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-09-30: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-09-30)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312525277275/ck0001711929-20250930.htm | redemption proration (2025-09-30)
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 42% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-09-19).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1557265/000121390026025198/ea0273363-01_ncsr.htm | redemption disclosure (redemption_fill_rate)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-09-19: 11.9% requested, only 42.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-09-19)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1557265/000121390026025198/ea0273363-01_ncsr.htm | redemption proration (2025-09-19)
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 4% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-08-31).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312525277275/ck0001711929-20250930.htm | redemption disclosure (redemption_fill_rate)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-08-31: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-08-31)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312525277275/ck0001711929-20250930.htm | redemption proration (2025-08-31)
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 47% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-08-22).
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1687898/000121390026065340/ea0291351-01_ncsr.htm | redemption disclosure (redemption_fill_rate)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-08-22: only 47.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-08-22)
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1687898/000121390026065340/ea0291351-01_ncsr.htm | redemption proration (2025-08-22)