Every red-flag and yellow-flag finding from the trailing 365 days across every
monitored fund, watchlist and universe, red flags first, then by recency.
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— Red flag · Private Real Estate.
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 3% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2026-03-31).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
The fund is at or near its allowed leverage limit (99% of permitted leverage in use as of 2026-03-31) (GAAP-equity approximation of a cost-basis charter test; the fund's own NASAA calculation may show compliance).
Why it matters
The fund is essentially at or beyond its permitted leverage. This can force asset sales at bad prices or halt distributions/repurchases; for a BDC it is a statutory line, not a preference.
Source: derived: (ceiling 300.0% of net assets - leverage 296.2%, denominator = charter net assets (total assets - total liabilities) 4,064,215,000) / ceiling * 100
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-03-31: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. (2026-03-31)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 3% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2026-02-28).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-02-28: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. (2026-02-28)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 51% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2026-02-27).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-02-27: only 51.0% of requests fulfilled. (2026-02-27)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 27% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2026-02-03).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-02-03: only 27.0% of requests fulfilled. (2026-02-03)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 3% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2026-01-31).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-01-31: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. (2026-01-31)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 16% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2026-01-30).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1515001/000121390026065345/ea0290589-01_ncsr.htm | Harrison N-CSR results table; accession=0001213900-26-065345; offer_pct=5; offered_shares=3335332; tendered_shares=20284799; implied_outstanding_shares=66706640.000000000000; filed Percentage of Tendered Shares Repurchased = 16%
The fund is at or near its allowed leverage limit (101% of permitted leverage in use as of 2025-12-31) (GAAP-equity approximation of a cost-basis charter test; the fund's own NASAA calculation may show compliance).
Why it matters
The fund is essentially at or beyond its permitted leverage. This can force asset sales at bad prices or halt distributions/repurchases; for a BDC it is a statutory line, not a preference.
Source: derived: (ceiling 300.0% of net assets - leverage 275.2%, denominator = charter net assets (total assets - total liabilities) 4,367,591,000) / ceiling * 100
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 51% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-11-21).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-11-21: only 51.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-11-21)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 30% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-11-04).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-11-04: only 30.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-11-04)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 22% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-10-24).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1515001/000121390026065345/ea0290589-01_ncsr.htm | Harrison N-CSR results table; accession=0001213900-26-065345; offer_pct=6; offered_shares=4311315; tendered_shares=19211446; implied_outstanding_shares=71855250.000000000000; filed Percentage of Tendered Shares Repurchased = 22%
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 4% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-09-30).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-09-30: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-09-30)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 4% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-08-31).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-08-31: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-08-31)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.
Redemption requests ran at least twice the tender offer's capacity; only 47% of tendered shares were repurchased (offer expired 2025-08-22).
Why it matters
Redemption requests ran at least twice the offer capacity. At this level pro-ration is severe and shareholder liquidity is materially constrained right now, not hypothetically.
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-08-22: only 47.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-08-22)
Why it matters
Redemption requests exceeded the offer and were paid only in part, pro rata. Investors who wanted out are still holding; unmet demand usually rolls into the next offer, making repeat proration -- the defining liquidity-stress pattern for a semi-liquid fund -- worth watching for.